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Just Compensation for Per Se
Environmental Takings
GEORGE GALGANO*
I. Introduction
The notion of exclusive ownership as a property right is fun-
damental to our theory of social organization .... The in-
truder who enters clothed in the robes of authority in broad
daylight commits no less an invasion of these rights than if
he sneaks in in the night wearing a burglar mask.'
Blackstone once wrote that nothing "so generally strikes
at the imagination and engages the affections of mankind, as
the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other indi-
vidual."2 John Locke espoused a similar concept embracing
property rights as absolute. 3
However, anyone familiar with basic tenets of land use
law is aware that today "sole and despotic dominion" cannot
truly be exercised. 4 Changing social conditions and height-
ened awareness of environmental conditions have led to a
dramatic increase in land regulations. 5 One economist has
estimated that land use controls have increased an astonish-
* Wesleyan University, B.A., 1994. Pace University School of Law, J.D.
expected, 1999.
1. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1991).
2. I. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 393 (1782).
3. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, THE SECOND TREA-
TISE OF CwnrL GovERNMENT 123-31 (Thomas I. Cook ed. 1947).
4. See id.
5. See generally ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE (5"'
ed. 1997).
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ing 3000 percent since the turn of the century. 6 Fortunately
for landowners, all of these controls are limited by the United
States Constitution.7
In 1791 the Bill of Rights, consisting of the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution, was ratified.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads: "[nior
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."" The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."9 In 1897, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause as applicable to state actions. 10
For decades, courts have struggled with defining what consti-
tutes private property, 1' public use,12 and just compensa-
tion.' 3 Courts and commentators have attempted to classify
different types of government actions in evaluating whether a
taking has occurred. 14 In attempting to classify government
actions, many courts have unnecessarily created a difficult
and unpredictable model of what constitutes a taking. This
Comment will provide a general overview of the takings
clause and will address the landmark decision in Loretto v.
6. See ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS 87 (1996).
7. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897).
11. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. City of Rockledge, 920 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir.
1991); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1986).
12. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See generally GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (131 ed. 1997).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Peewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951); United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950); United States v.
105.40 Acres of Land, 471 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1972).
14. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971) (citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964)); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,15 which pro-
duced the "permanent physical occupation" classification.
This Comment will further focus on and explore takings
claims based on environmental surveillance. Under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response & Liability Act (CER-
CLA),16 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
authority to gain access to real property and conduct tests -
some of which require both the removal of soil and installa-
tion of monitoring devices.' 7 Affected property owners have,
in the past, challenged environmental surveillance as an un-
constitutional taking.'8 While some landowners have been
successful, 19 others have not.20 This Comment will conclude
that the current analysis of takings claims based on the phys-
ical occupation of private property must continue to be
treated as per se compensable. However, this Comment will
ultimately advance the theory that the compelling govern-
ment interest in regulating and treating hazardous wastes
requires a non-traditional approach to calculating what just
compensation should be.
II. Background
A. The Concept of Takings
One of the principal purposes of modern government is to
protect private property.21 However, the government's right
to take private property has been recognized at common law
for decades. 22 The concept of takings emanated with the
shift from the feudal system to private ownership of prop-
15. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
17. See id. § 9604(e)(1), (3), (4).
18. See Stephen Daren Blevit, A Tale of Two Amendments: Property Rights
and Takings in the Context of Environmental Surveillance, 68 S. CAL. L. REV
885, 894-903 (1995).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hendler, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434 (7 Cir. 1988).
21. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT, THE SECOND TREA-
TISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 123-31 (Thomas I. Cook ed. 1947).
22. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 77 (1995).
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erty.23 Under the feudal system, one held property by tenure
granted from the sovereign.2 4 In a strict sense, the sovereign
could not "take" what it already owned and therefore, prior to
the end of feudalism, it was unnecessary to discuss whether
an appropriation even occurred. 25
The most intrusive government taking is exercised
through the process of eminent domain, 26 whereby legal title
to private property is transferred to the government in ex-
change for compensation to the property owner.27 The pro-
cess of exercising eminent domain is often referred to as
condemnation or expropriation.28 Because the government's
right to expropriate property has long been recognized, 29
challenges to takings pursuant to eminent domain are rare.
Takings actions based on excessive government regulations,
however, have been the source of considerable litigation.30
The increased number of environmental regulations, in par-
ticular, has led to a rise in constitutional challenges alleging
that the government effected a taking without providing the
landowner with just compensation. 31
23. See I. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.2[21 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. 3d ed. 1998).
24. See Robert Rubin, Taking Clause v. Technology: Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV, A Victory for Tradition, 38 U. MiAMI L. REv. 165,
168 (1983).
25. See id.
26. See id. Grotius, a seventeenth-century philosopher, first advanced the
concept of eminent domain. Id. (citation omitted).
27. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 523 (6'" ed. 1990).
28. See BLAci's LAw DIcnoNARY 582 (6t' ed. 1990). See also Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 200 So. 2d 428, 433 (La. Ct. App.
1967).
29. See supra text accompanying note 23. However, the government's abil-
ity to take private property is restricted to public use. See U.S. CONST. amend.
V. This limitation has little practical effect on curtailing government action.
See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In Midkiff, the court
ruled that the state could exercise its eminent domain powers as a method of
wealth redistribution among private citizens. See id.
30. See Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a
Response to 'Environmental Takings," 46 S.C. L. REv. 613, 626 (1995).
31. See id.
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B. Regulatory Takings
Laws pertaining to coastal zone management, 32 wetland
protection,33 strip-mining,34 and livestock quarantines 35 have
been declared takings as applied to vested property rights. In
evaluating whether a particular government regulation con-
stitutes a regulatory taking, the courts have primarily con-
sidered three factors.36 These factors are: (1) the effect the
regulation has on the property's beneficial use; (2) the effect
of the regulation on the landowner's reasonable investment
backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmen-
tal act. 37 Generally, if the effect of an ordinance or regula-
tion deprives the landowner of all economically viable use of
the property, the action will be declared a taking.38
C. Permanent Physical Occupation
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 39 one of the three factors the court considered was the
character of the governmental action.40 The court stated, "[a]
'taking' may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government .... "41
Historically, the character of the government action has
been given great weight in determining whether a taking has
32. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (in-
terpreting the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act).
33. See Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (interpreting the
Clean Water Act).
34. See Whitney Benefits Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (interpreting the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act).
35. See Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
36. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
37. See id. See also Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wet-
lands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IowA L. REV. 527, 543 (1996).
38. See Lucas, supra note 32, at 1004 (1992). See also Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). This rule is not absolute. If the government
is able to demonstrate that the regulation seeks to prevent a nuisance, then
there will be no taking. See id. at 412.
39. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40. See supra text accompanying note 38.
41. 438 U.S. at 124.
19981
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occurred. 42 In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,43 640 acres of pri-
vate land was flooded due to the construction of a state-au-
thorized dam.44 The Supreme Court rejected the state's
argument that all consequential damages resulting from law-
ful state activity are noncompensable. 45 The Court stated
that, "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced
additions of water, earth, sand or other material, or by hav-
ing an artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectively de-
stroy its usefulness, it is a taking .... "46
Pumpelly was followed by a number of similar challenges
involving dam construction and its effect on private prop-
erty.47 In United States v. Cress,48 the landowner conceded
that the economic value of his property had only been dimin-
ished by fifty percent.49 Over the government's objection, the
Court found a partial taking, stating, "it is the character of
the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it
.... "50 The economic implications of the government's action
were completely ignored in Transportation Co. v. Chicago.5 1
In Transportation Co., the petitioner asserted that a taking
resulted from flooding that impeded only access to his prop-
erty.52 Despite significant economic impact to the subject
property, the Court held that since there was not a direct en-
croachment by the government, there could be no taking.53
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,54 the
Supreme Court was asked to rule whether a small yet perma-
nent physical occupation authorized by a state government
42. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 167.
45. See id. at 176.
46. Id. at 181.
47. See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); United States v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
48. 243 U.S. 316.
49. See id. at 327.
50. Id. at 328.
51. 99 U.S. 635.
52. See id. at 636.
53. See id. at 642.
54. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/18
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constituted a taking.55 On January 1, 1973, the State of New
York enacted § 828 of the Executive Law. 56 Section 828 pro-
vided "that a landlord may not 'interfere with the installation
of cable television facilities upon his property or premises
... ) "57 The law also prohibited the landlord from exacting
payment from any CATV company "in excess of the amount
the [State Commission on Cable Television] shall, by regula-
tion, determine to be reasonable."58
The physical occupation complained of in Loretto con-
sisted of a cable, less than one half-inch in diameter and ap-
proximately thirty-five feet in length.59 The cable ran along
the length of the building and was attached to directional
taps of an adjoining building.60 In addition, the cable com-
pany attached two silver boxes to the roof cable using nails
that penetrated the masonry of the building at two-foot inter-
55. See id.
56. See New York Public Service Law § 228 (1973) (originally enacted as
New York Exec. Law § 828).
1. No landlord shall:
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon
his property or premises, except that a landlord may require:
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to
such reasonable conditions as are necessary to protect the
safety, functioning and appearance of the premises, and the
convenience and well being of other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combi-
nation thereof bear the entire cost of installation, operation or
removal of such facilities; and
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the
landlord for any damage caused by the installation, operation
or removal of such facilities.
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in ex-
change for permitting cable television service on or within his
property or premises, or from any cable television company in ex-
change therefor in excess of any amount which the commission
shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable; or
c. discriminate in rental charges, or otherwise, between tenants
who receive cable television services and those who do not.
2. Rental agreements and leases executed prior to the effective date of
this article may be enforced notwithstanding this section.
458 U.S. at 423 n.3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 422.
60. See id.
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vals.61 On January 15, 1976, pursuant to New York Execu-
tive Law § 828(1)(b), the Cable Commission determined that
"a one-time $1 payment [was] the normal fee to which a land-
lord [was] entitled" for the placement of the components on
the properties. 62 Prior to the enactment of § 828, landowners
were customarily compensated at a rate equal to five percent
of the gross revenues Teleprompter derived from the land-
owner's particular property. 63
In 1976, Jean Loretto instituted a class action lawsuit on
behalf of herself and all owners of real property affected by
Teleprompter's placement of CATV components. 64 The com-
plaint alleged that the essentially free installation of cable
television components authorized by state statute constituted
an "uncompensated trespass" and a condemnation of property
in violation of the takings clause.65 The lower state court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stat-
ing, "the statute represents a reasonable and, therefore, justi-
fiable exercise of the police power of the State .. "66 The
court continued, stating, "[t]here is no question that the obvi-
ous public advantage sought to be served by the legislation
under attack greatly outweighs the insignificant nature of
the physical use of private property permitted by the
statute."67
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion without opinion. 68 On appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals, the decision was again affirmed. 69 In rejecting the
plaintiffs physical invasion claim, the court held that not all
invasions of private property authorized by the government
61. See id.
62. Id. at 423-24.
63. See id at 423.
64. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 180
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
65. See id. at 181.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 182.
68. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 550 (11t
Dept. 1979).
69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y.
1981).
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constitute takings.70 The court, in justifying its opinion, cited
the distinction between invasions authorized by the govern-
ment for an entrepreneurial purpose, 71 and those in which
the government acts as an arbiter. 72
The court characterized entrepreneurial purpose inva-
sions as those where the state acts in the furtherance of any
governmental program normally carried out by govern-
ment. 73 The court defined invasions undertaken by the gov-
ernment in its arbitral capacity as those where government
interference is used to "straighten out situations in which the
citizenry is in conflict over land use or where one person's use
of his land is injurious to others."74 The court asserted that
when the government acts in its arbitral capacity, as in zon-
ing or enjoining a noxious use of land, the action is noncom-
pensable.75 The court also noted that the regulation failed to
present an excessive economic impact on the property and did
not interfere with Ms. Loretto's reasonable investment-
backed expectations.76
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' rul-
ing, stating that "an owner suffers a special kind of injury
when a stranger directly invades and occupies an owner's
property."77 However, the Court was cautious in noting that:
[tihe permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical oc-
cupation distinguish it from temporary limitations on the
right to exclude. Not every physical invasion is a tak-
70. See id. at 329.
71. See id. at 330-31. The Court of Appeals attempted to elucidate the gov-
ernment entrepreneurial invasion using two main cases: New York Tel. Co. v.
Town of North Hempstead, 363 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1977) (involving the govern-
ment's ability to enact an ordinance that granted a town the right to affix street
lighting to privately owned poles) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946).
72. See Loretto, 423 N.E.2d at 330.
73. See id.
74. Id. (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J.
36, 62, 63 (1964)).
75. See id. at 330.
76. See id. at 333-34. Ms. Loretto admitted that she bought the property
without knowledge as to Teleprompter's cable attachments. See id. at 323.
77. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436
(1982).
1998] 225
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ing.... [Tiemporary limitations are subject to a more com-
plex balancing process to determine whether they are a
taking. The rationale is evident: they do not absolutely
dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude
others from, his property.78
D. Just Compensation
The concept of providing just compensation for the tak-
ing of private property is rooted in English tradition.7 9 The
American colonists both before and after the Revolutionary
War embraced this tradition.80 However, as the population
and geographical area of the nation expanded throughout the
Revolutionary Era, uncompensated takings occurred on a
regular basis."'
The need to transform benevolence into obligation arose
after the Revolution, when states began to develop public
works projects, yet had insufficient funds to finance the activ-
ity.8 2 Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, only two
state constitutions addressed the issue of whether a taking of
private property by the state should be accompanied by com-
pensation.8 3 Vermont's constitution read, "whenever any
particular man's property is taken for the use of the public,
the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money."84 Massa-
chusetts' constitution provided that, "whenever public exi-
gencies require that the property of any individual should be
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable
78. Id. at 436 n.12.
79. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 78 (1995).
80. See id. (citing JAMES ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY RIGHT: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992)).
81. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 698
(1985). See also ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 (1996).
82. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 79 (1995).
83. See ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 (1996).
84. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. II, reprinted in VERMONT STATE PAPERS
241, 242 (W. Slade ed. 1823) (emphasis added).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/18
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compensation therefor."8 5 Often, states authorized the con-
struction of roads without paying for the real property or the
material necessary for the improvement.8 6 However, some
landowners failed to object to the appropriation because the
land was valueless without the roads.87
Under the United States Constitution, the takings clause
operates to prevent any government body from taking private
property for public use without providing just compensa-
tion.88 The courts' interpretation of the phrase "just compen-
sation" has been subject to widespread criticism.8 9 The
takings clause is now interpreted as remedial in nature. 90
The appropriate remedy in the event of a taking is the pay-
ment of just compensation, as opposed to the invalidation of
the regulation. 91 Although the government may voluntarily
choose to withdraw the particular condition that creates the
taking, it is not required to do so. 92 As such, the takings
clause itself does not limit the government's power to enact
legislation; it merely requires payment to the affected land-
owner.93 Historically, this has not always been the case. 94
If the government refuses to withdraw the unconstitu-
tional regulation, the landowner is undoubtedly entitled to
just compensation. The current method used by federal
courts to ascertain what constitutes just compensation is the
85. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X (emphasis added).
86. See ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7, 10-11 (1996).
87. See id.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV (emphasis added). See also Chicago, B. &
Q.R. Co., v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (incorporating the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment).
89. See ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7, 10-11 (1996).
90. See Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation
Abroad: Private Property Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environ-
mental Protection, 65 U. CAN. L. REV. 539, 557 (1997).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that
the Kohler Act could not be "sustained as an exercise of the police power" be-
cause it deprived the landowner of all economically viable use).
1998] 227
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fair market value test (FV). 95 Under FMV an'aggrieved
landowner is entitled to receive "what the willing buyer
would pay in cash to a willing seller" at the time of the tak-
ing.96 FMV can be calculated using one or a combination of
up to three distinct tests.97 These tests are:
(1) "Comparable sales" or "market data" approach: the
sales of comparable properties (in size, location, and time)
are gathered to arrive at the value of the subject property;
(2) "Income Capitalization" approach: the amount of in-
come the property generates and is projected to generate-
generally based on past history over the reasonably fore-
seeable future is determined and then discounted to its
present value; and
(3) "Reproduction or Replacement cost less depreciation" or
"cost" approach: the present cost to construct a similar or
comparable structure to that being taken less depreciation
is estimated. 98
Despite the federal courts' preference in measuring just
compensation by FMV, there are circumstances where the
courts deviate from the favored standard. 99 In United States
v. Commodities Trading Corporation (CTC),100 the Supreme
Court stated that "[it] has never attempted to prescribe a
rigid rule for determining what is 'just compensation' under
all the circumstances and in all cases."1 1 In CTC, the gov-
ernment sought to enforce a price ceiling on pepper, pursuant
to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,102 which re-
flected a price significantly less than FMV. 10 3 The Court,
95. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979).
96. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
97. See H. DIXoN MONTAGUE, THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF EMINENT DOMAIN:
A FACTUAL ANALYSIS OF A FANTASY WORLD'S DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPEN-
SATION, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 12-29 (1992)
(citing AMERICAN INST. OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL
ESTATE (6t' ed. 1974)).
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 123.
102. 50 U.S.C. § 921 (repealed 1966).
103. See 339 U.S. at 123.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/18
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although acknowledging FMV as the preferred standard,
stated that "when its application would result in manifest in-
justice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied
other standards."10 4 The Court continued, "[wie think the
congressional purpose and necessities of a wartime economy
require that ceiling prices be accepted as the measure of just
compensation...."105
The need to deviate from the traditional and preferred
method of computing just compensation is even greater when
the taking is for an indeterminate period, and when the prop-
erty taken is seldom exchanged.' 0 6 A taking may be for a
temporary or indeterminate period of time.10 7 In Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States,0 8 a private laundry establish-
ment was physically taken by the government to service the
needs of the Armed Forces during wartime.' 0 9 In refusing to
award damages based on FMV loss, the Court stated that
some loss to an owner for property or "idiosyncratic attach-
ment to it, like loss due to an exercise of police power is prop-
erly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship." 1 0
E. The Administrative Process Under CERCLA
The United States is the world's foremost industrial
power."' Industrial operations naturally require the dispo-
sal of certain hazardous by-products. 112 Prior to the enact-
ment of the Solid Waste Disposal Act 113  and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 1 4 industries were free
to dispose of their wastes in any manner they saw fit. For
104. Id.
105. Id. at 124.
106. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
107. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles,
California, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
108. 338 U.S. 1.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 5.
111. See ALLAN TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 1.1 (1992).
112. See id.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1994).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
1998] 229
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years, common industry practice entailed the burial of waste
products in land adjacent to plant sites. 115 Some companies
sent their hazardous wastes to local municipal landfills with
non-hazardous refuse or shipped them in drums and tank
trucks to processing and treatment facilities. 1 6 Many of the
practices failed to consider possible effects on the environ-
ment and human health.
As Love Canal" 7 and other famous environmental disas-
ters came to the forefront of the media, Congress took note of
the inadequate safeguards in the hazardous waste indus-
try.1 8 Love Canal was an abandoned chemical dumpsite
which began to emit noxious odors and dangerous liquids
that ultimately led to a community-wide evacuation. 1 9
CERCLA120 was enacted to address the increasing public con-
cern over industrialization and hazardous waste disposal
practices illuminated by the Love Canal catastrophe. In par-
ticular, the Act sought to preserve the integrity of the Na-
tion's surface and groundwater. 12'
One representative noted that, "[tihese hazardous wastes
remained almost invisible until recently ... it is incumbent
on us to deal with them and make sure the lives and health of
Americans are not unreasonably jeopardized by exposure to
toxic substances."122 Love Canal was undoubtedly a primary
impetus behind the representative's remarks and ultimately
the passage of CERCLA.' 23
115. See 125 CONG. REC. 613-615 (1979) (statement of Rep. La Falce).
116. See id.
117. Love Canal is the name of an abandoned chemical dumpsite in Niagra
Falls. See, e.g., supra note 115.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
121. See U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1071-72 (D. Colo. 1985)
(CERCLA was designed to address the consequences of improperly disposed
hazardous waste); Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487,
1489 (D.N.J. 1985) (CERCLA was enacted as a response to increasing concern
over abandoned and inactive sites that contain hazardous waste).
122. 125 CONG. REC. 613 (1979) (statement of Sen. La Falce).
123. See id.
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1. Identification of a Hazardous Site
CERCLA enables EPA to identify contaminated sites and
impose liability on potentially responsible parties (PRPs).124
PRPs are classified as: (1) present "owners and operators" of
hazardous waste sites; (2) "owners or operators" of the site at
the time the hazardous waste was disposed; (3) waste genera-
tors who arranged for the disposal at the site; and (4) trans-
porters of the waste that chose the particular disposal site. 125
CERCLA's administrative process begins with the identi-
fication of a potential Superfund site.' 26 Under CERCLA,
only sites placed on the national priority list (NPL) qualify for
Superfund-financed remediation. 27 A potential site can be
brought to EPA's attention through a variety of means. 128
Most sites are first identified by state agencies, which in turn
inform EPA.' 29 Once EPA is notified of a potential site, the
property is listed in the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse and Liability Information System (CERCLIS).30 Af-
ter a site is listed on CERCLIS, an on-scene coordinator
(OSC) is assigned to conduct the first investigation at the
site.131
The OSC compiles site information using photographs,
interviews, site condition records, and samplings. 32 The
OSC has a field assistance team and a technical assistance
team to aid in data collection. 33 The field assistance team
124. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
125. See id.
126. See ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE 39 (1991).
127. See id. at 40. Sites not listed on the NPL may however qualify for
Brownfields development. The Brownfields Initiative involves the redirection of
resources for the development of industrial or commercial sites that have con-
tamination. See Lari DeBrie Thanheiser, The Allure of a Lure: Proposed Federal
Land Use Restriction Easements in Remediation of Contaminated Property, 24
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 274, 279 (1997).
128. See ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAw AND PROCEDURE 39 (1991).
129. See id. On occasion a site will be referred to EPA by a private party. Id.
(citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 830 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. (citation omitted).
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completes the preliminary assessment (PA), which attempts
"to determine whether there has been or is likely to be a haz-
ardous release from the facility."1 34 The PA addresses a
number of factors in its ultimate recommendation. 135 Among
the factors are the "site description and management prac-
tices; waste characteristics; disposal pathways, groundwater
uses, and drinking water sources; and receptor population,
and environment." 36 The second stage of the PA is an histor-
ical review of regulatory activity at the site.'3 7 On-site inves-
tigation during the PA stage is infrequent. 38 The final PA
document consists of a general report that may recommend
further investigation. 139
If the PA recommends additional investigation, a physi-
cal inspection of the property is conducted. 140 The site in-
spection consists of a two-part process. 14 ' The first part
involves a "screening site analysis" to determine the severity
of the threat posed. 142 The second part involves the collec-
tion of information required for the hazard-ranking system
(HRS), and is used for the remedial investigation/feasibility
study (RI/FS). 143
The RI/FS is utilized to identify site objectives according
to a site-management strategy.'4 The site-management
strategy is broken down into seven steps. 145 The initial step
of the RI/FS is scoping.' 46 During the scoping stage, data is
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. (citation omitted).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 45.
145. See id. The seven steps include: "(1) scoping, (2) community relations,
(3) site characterization, (4) baseline risk assessment, (5) treatability studies,
(6) development and screening of remedial alternatives, and (7) detailed analy-
sis of remedial alternatives." Id.
146. See id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/18
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collected from the site, and an EPA or a PRP contractor
prepares documentation addressing a variety of factors. 147
Another step in the RI/FS stage is site characteriza-
tion.148 During this stage, EPA attempts to identify specific
areas that "pose a threat to human health or the environ-
ment."1 49 Site characterization involves the collection of in-
formation pertaining to the physical characteristics of both
the subject site and the surrounding area. 50 Physiology, ge-
ology, and hydrology are studied to determine the projection
of transport of contaminants.' 51 Boundaries of contamina-
tion and potential releases are also identified. 52 If EPA de-
cides to initiate a response action, 153 it can be either a
removal action 54 or a remedial action. 155 "The national goal
of the remedy selection process is to select remedies that are
protective of the environment and human health, that main-
147. See id. at 46.
148. See id.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id
153. A response means "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all
such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include en-
forcement activities related thereto." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994).
154. See id. § 9601(23). A removal action:
means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances
from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in
the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the
environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess,
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such
other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate
damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment,
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release....
Id.
155. See id. § 9601(24). A remedial action:
means those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken in-
stead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment,
to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that
they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment.
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tain protection over time . -."1 Because remedy selection
dictates the public and private costs of the Superfund Pro-
gram, 157 it is important that EPA is well informed as to the
consequences of proposed actions as well as available alterna-
tives. The process of selecting an appropriate remedy takes,
on average, eight years from the time the site is identified.' 58
The physical clean-up itself takes approximately forty-three
months. 159
2. Access to Property
EPA has statutory authority under CERCLA to enter
contaminated property or adjacent lands to effectuate its re-
medial purposes. 160 In addition, Congress has granted EPA
authority to acquire real property through eminent domain
for long-term access and response purposes. 16 1 Offsite access
to property abutting an identified site is sometimes necessary
to carry out required investigatory and remedial activities. 162
However, in some instances, EPA's activities have exceeded
mere "access" to adjoining property. 163
EPA's statutory authority to enter property does not in-
terfere with a landowner's ability to establish a government
156. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(i) (1997).
157. See Scott C. Whitney, Superfund Reform: Clarification of Cleanup Stan-
dards to Rationalize the Remedy Selection Process, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 183,
188 (1995).
158. See Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy
Selection, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 581 (1995).
159. See id. (citing JEAN PAUL ACTON, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND: A No-
GRESS REPORT 16 (1995)).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(1), (3).
161. See id. § 9604(j).
162. See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
163. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7t' Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 811 (1986), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1002
(1986). In Outboard, EPA wanted to perform a walk-through of the property,
set markers, survey the property, and collect twenty-three soil borings. EPA
needed 70 days to complete the project and would need over 1000 square feet of
parking space for sixteen vehicles. Ultimately, the Court held that CERCLA
failed to grant EPA authority to access property for remedial activities. The
Superfund Amendment Reauthorization Act amendments explicitly gave EPA
authority to compel the release of information and to enter property to under-
take response activities. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(2)-(3).
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taking.164 In Hendler v. United States,1 65 owners of property
adjacent to the Stringfellow Superfund Site sought just com-
pensation as a result of EPA's continued use of their prop-
erty.1 66 In Hendler, EPA issued a unilateral administrative
order granting access to Hendler's property in order to locate,
construct, operate, maintain, and repair monitoring extrac-
tion wells.' 67 At the time of trial, EPA had installed some
twenty-two wells reaching nearly 100 feet into the ground.1 68
The wells were lined with stainless steel and plastic and en-
cased in cement and gravel. 169 They were individually
capped and enclosed by a railing of steel pipe with a cement
foundation.' 70 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the wells constituted a permanent physical occupa-
tion. 17' Furthermore, the court stated, "[a] permanent physi-
cal occupation does not require that in every instance the
occupation be continuous and uninterrupted." 7 2
Recently, a New York court held that well casings and
piezometers placed on the plaintiffs' property by a local waste
management authority constituted a "permanent physical oc-
cupation."' 73 In Juliano v. Montgomery-Ostego-Schoharie
Solid Waste Management Authority, 74 the plaintiffs alleged
that the placement of visual site inspection equipment on
their property constituted a taking.175 The Montgomery-Os-
tego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management Authority (MOSA),
in seeking to establish a solid waste management facility,
identified fourteen potential sites for the future erection of
164. See Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1378.
165. 952 F.2d 1364.
166. See id. at 1369. EPA had been using the Hendler's property since 1983.
167. See Hendler v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 91, 93 (1986), rev'd in part 952
F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
168. See Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1376.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1377.
172. Id.
173. See Juliano v. Montgomery-Ostego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management
Auth., 983 F. Supp. 319, 328 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
174. 983 F. Supp. 319.
175. See id. at 323.
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the facility. 176 After obtaining permission from the fourteen
property owners for visual site inspections, MOSA represent-
atives narrowed the number of potential sites to three, of
which the plaintiffs' property was one.177 MOSA and the
plaintiffs established an agreement that allowed MOSA to
enter and test the plaintiffs' property for the payment of
$1000.178
MOSA tested the plaintiffs' property, which included the
"excavation of test pits, drilling and sampling of borings, in-
stallation of monitoring wells and piezometers, surface and
bore hole geophysical survey, hydraulic conductivity testing,
and pumping tests."179 For almost three years MOSA tested
the plaintiffs' property which included, at the time of trial,
the presence of twenty-four monitoring wells and eight
piezometers. 8 0
The court identified two takings issues: (1) whether the
presence of the twenty-four monitoring wells and eight pi-
ezometers' 8 ' on the plaintiffs' property constituted a "perma-
nent physical occupation" necessitating just compensation
and (2) whether MOSA's classification of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty as a possible waste management facility constituted a
regulatory taking. 8 2 The court found that MOSA's under-
takings had deprived the plaintiffs' of their right to possess
the property and exclude others from it.183 In addition, the
court held that the plaintiffs would be unable to make use of
their property where the site equipment still remained. 84
However, the court found that the plaintiffs were not de-
prived of their right to "forever deny [their] power to control
176. See id. at 322.
177. See id.
178. See id. The plaintiffs claimed that MOSA representatives coerced them
into signing the agreement by alleging that if they did not sign it, MOSA would
be allowed to test the property anyway. See id. at n.1.
179. Id. at 322.
180. See id.
181. The wells and piezometers were each four inches in diameter and
nearly three feet above the ground. See id. at 325.
182. See id. at 323.
183. See id. at 325.
184. See id.
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the use of the property." 185 Although the court considered the
temporal aspects of physical occupations, it noted that in de-
termining what constitutes a "permanent physical occupa-
tion," the term "permanent" should be defined as that which
is "intended to exist or function for a long, indefinite period
without regard to unforeseeable conditions." 18 6 In this case,
the court found that the process necessary to decommission
the wells and piezometers would constitute a permanent
physical taking. 8 7 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
regulatory taking claim was not ripe for judicial review.',
III. Analysis
The Loretto court explicitly stated that not every physical
invasion is a taking.8 9 However, the distinction between
physical occupations of private property and mere invasions
is slight. As a result, courts frequently misapply the appro-
priate test in deciding whether the government has effected a
taking. A primary example of this misapplication of tests can
be found in Hendler, 90 where the court applied the per se
physical occupation rule but predicated its holding on the ra-
tionale that the occupation of the property need not be per-
manent.19' The Hendler court incorrectly stated that "[a]
permanent physical occupation does not require that in every
instance the occupation be exclusive, or continuous and unin-
terrupted."1 92 These criteria identify the characteristics of
invasion. As such, if the Hendler court found that EPA's in-
trusion was not exclusive, continuous, or uninterrupted, then
185. Id.
186. Id. at 327 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (1979)).
187. See id. at 328. MOSA's Decommissioning Protocol provides that the
decommissioning of wells and piezometers consists of "removing or destroying
the well casing and surface seal, and filling the hole by pressure injection of
cement betonite grout. Grout from the upper five feet of the hole is then re-
moved and the area is backfilled with compacted native materials." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
188. See id. at 329.
189. See supra text accompanying note 78.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 164-172.
191. See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
192. Id.
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it should have applied the balancing test used for regulatory
takings. Had the court done this, EPA's invasion would only
weigh as one of the three factors set forth in Penn Central.193
EPA's intrusion in Hendler clearly met the requisite level
of permanence set forth in Loretto.194 So, although the ulti-
mate finding of the court was correct, the reasoning was not.
Unfortunately, Hendler further muddles the distinction be-
tween invasions and occupations of private property.
The increased number of enacted environmental statutes
has given rise to considerable constitutional challenges by
landowners alleging that the government's application of the
law effected a regulatory taking of private property.195 These
regulatory challenges should continue to be addressed by the
courts in a manner consistent with the test articulated in
Penn Central. 196 A physical invasion of property, under Penn
Central, should continue to be considered by the court as the
character of the government action. The character of the gov-
ernment's action is only one factor in the court's three prong
ad hoc inquiry into an alleged regulatory taking.197 As such,
a mere physical invasion is not determinative. A physical in-
vasion will need to be balanced with the economic impact on
the property as well as the effect the regulation has on the
landowner's reasonably backed economic expectations. A
physical occupation, however, should not be subjected to a
balancing test.
Support for the per se physical occupation rule can be
traced back to the Revolutionary period. 198 Regulatory tak-
ings were an addition to the per se rule of physical expropria-
tion. It was only after the courts began to recognize
regulatory takings that the case-by-case inquiry came about.
To subject physical occupations to this type of analysis would
allow the exception to swallow the rule. Furthermore, doing
193. See supra text accompanying note 37.
194. See supra text accompanying note 78.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 31.
196. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
197. See supra text accompanying note 40.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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so would undermine long established principles of eminent
domain.
The objective of CERCLA is to protect and maintain
human health and the environment.199 This is clearly a com-
pelling government interest. The intrusion into offsite prop-
erty when remediating a contaminated Superfund site is an
unfortunate, yet necessary consequence of EPA action. Such
action is necessary to accomplish the legislative intent of
CERCLA. Whether EPA chooses to respond to a release of
hazardous waste by way of remedial or removal action, the
government's activities invariably affect adjoining landown-
ers' property rights. The degree of effect, however, depends
on the particular circumstances of the site, which are ad-
dressed throughout CERCLA's administrative process. The
compelling government interest underlying CERCLA, and
the absence of less intrusive alternatives to its access provi-
sions, should not be considered by the courts in determining
whether a taking has occurred. Instead, this type of analysis
must be left for the courts' evaluation as to whether the par-
ticular government action violates due process.
The fact that the government's interest in enforcing
CERCLA is inapplicable to the courts' determination as to
whether a taking exists does not make the government's in-
terest completely extraneous to the takings clause. The con-
stitutional limitation placed on the government is not
substantive. The federal government is free to enact any reg-
ulation provided it meets due process requirements. Because
the appropriate remedy to a taking is either payment to the
affected landowner or voluntary withdrawal by the govern-
ment of the offending regulation, 200 there is no concern that a
public imperative will go unaddressed due to the existence of
the takings clause.
The government's interest, although irrelevant to the
existence of a taking, can be a factor in proscribing the land-
owner's remedy. The history of the Fifth Amendment indi-
cates that the framers wanted to ensure that an
199. See supra text accompanying notes 117-121.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
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uncompensated taking did not occur, yet nonetheless wished
to grant legislatures and courts latitude in determining what
constituted just compensation. At the time the Fifth Amend-
ment was enacted, few state constitutions provided for any
type of compensation.20 1 The documents that did address
compensation in exchange for property, stated that the de-
prived landowner should receive "an equivalent in money" in
exchange for the taking of property.20 2 The framers' of the
Fifth Amendment refusal to adopt a specific procedure or
even a medium of exchange in the event of a taking supports
the contention that the government's interest should be con-
sidered in deciding what is "just" within the meaning of "just
compensation."
Although federal courts have expressed a preferred
method of computing just compensation, they have histori-
cally considered the interest of the public and the injustice
that would occur if one method was absolute. 203 The courts'
willingness to stray from the standard FMV formula is best
illustrated by the physical expropriation cases that took
place during World War 11.204 Access provisions under CER-
CLA serve to combat a similar threat to the health and wel-
fare of our communities.
Adherence to the per se physical occupation rule ad-
vanced in Loretto205 poses little threat to the environmental-
ists' agenda. In offering just compensation for a taking,
courts must consider the benefit conferred to the affected
landowner. Indeed, it is easy to imagine instances where an
affected landowner derives a net benefit from the physical oc-
cupation of the government. A successful removal action un-
doubtedly increases the marketability of real estate adjoining
the site. A similar comparison can be made to the Revolu-
tionary Era when land was permanently appropriated with-
out compensation for the establishment of roads and other
public works projects.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
202. See supra text accompanying note 84.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 99-110.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 99-110.
205. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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IV. Conclusion
Physical occupations of private property must continue
to be ruled per se takings under the Fifth Amendment. The
increasing number of environmental regulations that author-
ize access to private property must be subject to the same
scrutiny that past regulations have been subjected to. How-
ever, environmentalists need not be alarmed by the potential
implications of the rule. Entrance does not equal occupation,
and in most instances EPA's activities will be deemed tempo-
ral and hence only an invasion. In addition, if a court deter-
mines that EPA's intrusion rises to the level of occupation,
then the just compensation provision of the takings clause
may significantly reduce the EPA's liability to the landowner.
25
